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Abstract
A new viewpoint on electoral involvement is proposed from the study of the statistics of the proportions
of abstentionists, blank and null, and votes according to list of choices, in a large number of national
elections in different countries. Considering 11 countries without compulsory voting (Austria, Canada,
Czech Republic, France, Germany, Italy, Mexico, Poland, Romania, Spain and Switzerland), a stylized
fact emerges for the most populated cities when one computes the entropy associated to the three ratios,
which we call the entropy of civic involvement of the electorate. The distribution of this entropy (over all
elections and countries) appears to be sharply peaked near a common value. This almost common value is
typically shared since the 1970’s by electorates of the most populated municipalities, and this despite the
wide disparities between voting systems and types of elections. Performing different statistical analyses,
we notably show that this stylized fact reveals particular correlations between the blank/null votes and
abstentionists ratios.
We suggest that the existence of this hidden regularity, which we propose to coin as a ‘weak law on
recent electoral behavior among urban voters’, reveals an emerging collective behavioral norm character-
istic of urban citizen voting behavior in modern democracies. Analyzing exceptions to the rule provide
insights into the conditions under which this normative behavior can be expected to occur.
Introduction
Each election yields a variable proportion of citizens not taking part in the vote. The proportion of the
uninvolved population – either by non-registering, abstaining or voting blank or null – has been much
less studied than the vote itself.
Nowadays such behaviors are increasing among the longest-established democracies and their meaning
may be changing. Besides passive abstention (due to carelessness or indifference), an active refusal of vote
– possibly bearing a political message – is rising among population categories which are usually taking
part in the election.
The modalities of withdrawal [1]
To measure this phenomenon accurately, we first need to define the non-voter turnout. The boundary
between voters and non-voters is indeed blurred as several intermediate behaviors exist, such as non-
registering or blank vote.
The potential voter population depends on the legal requirements of citizenship, residency and ca-
pacity. Registration on the electoral roll does not necessarily imply voting. Moreover, the diversity of
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enumeration methods from one country to another makes it difficult to compare directly ratios of vot-
ers. The main trend consists in comparing abstention to the number of citizens entitled to vote (VEP:
Voting Eligible Population). However, in the United States for instance, abstention was calculated until
recently by comparison to the population above the voting age, including foreigners (VAP: Voting Age
Population), the corresponding abstention rate often reaching 50%. Another bias stems from the fact
that some countries made voting compulsory (namely Belgium, Luxembourg, Greece, and for a time the
Netherlands, Austria and Italy). Without compulsory voting, a declining voter turnout is observed since
the 1980s in established democracies.
Moreover, the meaning of blank and null vote is not obvious. They could be considered at first sight
as equivalent to abstention or non-registering, since they seem to translate an absence of choice. This
hypothesis would be in agreement with the systematic reviews of the minutes of polling stations for
instance.
Abstention has been primarily considered to be a micro-level phenomenon. But is it really? Several
studies have proven that socio-economic characteristics such as gender [2,3], age [4], education [5,6] and
ethnicity [7] have an influence on electoral non-participation. To what extent does living in a community
with low level of electoral involvement influence a voter?
The political and institutional context of the election
The comparative database collected by the Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA [8])
gathered data from elections in 171 countries from 1945 to 1999. It shows that participation rates are
slightly higher in countries that have adopted a system of proportional representation, offering a larger
choice to voters than those which have a majority or mixed systems. The highest turnout recorded
(over 83% observed in both Malta and Ireland) corresponds to the system of ‘single transferable vote’
which gives the voter a large liberty margin. (This system, called Hare system of voting, is a variant of
proportional representation where the voters rank the candidates according to their preferences.)
The nature of the election may be important too, depending on the context. In France for example,
as the president has a lot of power, the participation rate of the presidential election is especially high
when compared to the parliamentary election.
Abstention and Blank and null votes
The reason why analysis of political sciences are paying little attention to blank and null votes is mostly
based on the fact that these ballots are representing a very small number. Typically, these votes are
aggregated within a single category, Blank and null votes, in some countries simply called Null (or Invalid)
votes. Multitudinous studies have demonstrated from the 1950s on that null ballots were subdivided at
random, according to the law of large number and distributed haphazardly for a given manner of voting [9].
The analysis of each voting office is still confirming that. However, the blank votes are more sensible to
the conjuncture of consultation and are taking, with regard to abstention, a more complex signification.
Statistical analysis shows an often quite important negative correlation between abstention and Blank
or invalid votes. In France, notably, it has often been observed that the more rural the municipality,
the larger the ratio of Blank and null ballots. By contrast, the more populated the city, the larger
the abstention ratio. However, the link between Abstention and Blank and null ballots becomes more
complex in urban context. The urbanization has led to important changes in lifestyle and therefore in
the voting behavior in large municipalities. Voters casting a blank vote are having motivations closer
to voters abstaining for political reasons. This “civic abstention”, as Alain Lancelot called it, expresses
a particular attitude regarding the voting procedure [9, 10]. This political attitude of “withdrawal” or
political “offside” is not easy to analyze.
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Looking for stylized facts
In this paper, we analyze electoral data in order to better understand the interrelation between Absten-
tion, Blank and null ballots and the expression of the vote, focusing on highly populated municipalities
and recent elections. For this aim, we consider together the three values: Abstention, Blank/null and
Valid votes ratios. We identify statistical regularities with an approach in the spirit of recent statistical
physics analysis of elections data – see e.g. [11–23].
By analyzing a large number of elections in 11 different countries without compulsory voting, we
point out that they share a common feature when considering highly populated municipalities in recent
elections (as specified later). Introducing a measure of civic involvement of electorate, we show that this
quantity exhibits a sharply peaked distribution around a common value. Moreover we suggest that this
common stylized fact, that we propose to call a ‘weak law on recent electoral behavior among urban
voters’, reveals an emerging collective behavioral norm, typical of citizen voting behavior in modern
democracies.
The paper is organized as follows. First we describe the dataset used in this study, at three different
scales (at the municipality scale, at larger scale but for older times, and at the polling station level when
it is possible). Then, we introduce and discuss what we call the involvement entropy. We then analysis
electoral data according to this measure, and give signs of existence of a possible norm revealed by a
common-value of this measure. The Appendix S1 in the Supporting Information (SI) gives more details
when it is necessary.
Materials and Methods
Dataset
In this paper we analyze electoral data at three different scales. (1) Data aggregated at the municipality
scale. By this way, we study phenomena with respect to the population size of municipalities. The 76
elections studied in this paper at municipality level are mostly recent, after 1990, and are taken from 11
different countries (Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Italy, Mexico, Poland, Romania,
Spain and Switzerland). (2) Electoral data aggregated at large scale, e.g. national, provincial, etc. Here,
we focus the analysis on time evolution. Countries studied for their historical aspects are those which are
studied at the municipality scale. The study begins at the earliest year as possible, i.e. at the beginning
of so-called democratic regimes, after World War II, and even earlier for some cases (e.g. 1884 for the
≈ 530 Swiss referendums). (3) Electoral data aggregated at the polling station level. Polling stations
over the 100 most populated municipalities are analyzed, whenever it is possible to do so (i.e. for Canada,
France, Mexico, Poland and Romania). Some intra-towns phenomena are investigated by this way.
Some elections are studied as a function of the number N of registered voters by municipality. This is
the case when the following conditions are valid: (1) elections in a democratic country with no compulsory
voting, and no duty against people who do not vote; (2) the number of registered voters by municipality
is well established (in particular this excludes from our study both the U.S.A. and England); (3) available
data provide for each municipality, at least, the number of registered voters, the number of votes or the
turnout rate, and the number of valid votes. We note that all countries for which we have the data at
the municipality scale have more than 2000 municipalities, which allows us to make statistical analysis.
Moreover, all elections studied here are national ones, except for Land Parliament elections in Germany.
Lastly, the choice of the studied elections is not rooted on a plan but simply on the availability of electoral
data.
Among these 76 elections, 31 of them are also analyzed at polling station level in the 100 most
populated town: 5 from Canada (≈ 25000 polling stations), 13 from France (≈ 7000 polling stations),
4 from Mexico (≈ 55000 ballot boxes), 11 from Poland (≈ 8000 polling stations), and 4 from Romania
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(≈ 6000 polling stations). Tab.1 summarizes the set of elections studied in this paper, and more details
on these data are given in Appendix S1, Section A.
The Appendix S1, Section A, gives more information about the set of (public) electoral data studied
in this paper. Most of them can be directly downloaded from official websites (see References in Appendix
S1). Part of the database used in this paper can also be directly downloaded from [24].
Abstentions, valid votes and blank or null votes
Let us describe the citizen classification here retained to characterize the electoral mobilization of regis-
tered voters. For each given election and each specific scale (a municipality, a province, a country, etc.)
we distinguish: (1) the total number N of registered Voters; (2) the number Na of Abstentionists, the
persons who do not take part to the election; (3) the number Nv of voters, among which (4) Nbn Blank
and Null Votes (some countries, like Canada and Poland, aggregate Blank and Null votes in an only one
term called as Null votes, or Invalid votes, or Spoilt votes) and (5) Nc Votes in favor of candidates or
electoral list of choices, also sometimes called Valid Votes (see Fig. 1). Obviously Nv = Nc + Nbn and
N = Na +Nc +Nbn. Note that in Italy, Spain, and Switzerland, electoral data distinguish between Null
Votes, Nn, and Blank Votes, Nb. Moreover, only in Spain, “Votos Va´lidos” means Nv −Nn, that differs
from other countries where “Valid Votes” means Nv−Nn−Nb. In this paper, we consider for all countries
that Valid Votes are defined as Nc = Nv −Nbn. See Section F in Appendix S1 for more discussion about
countries where Blank Votes and Null Votes are distinguished between each other.
As discussed in the following, we characterize the civic involvement of registered voters by the choice
between the three possible sates, Abstention, Blank or Null Vote and Valid Vote. The civic involvement
of electors is then here measured through the set of the three ratios {pa, pc, pbn}, defined by
pa =
Na
N
, pc =
Nc
N
, pbn =
Nbn
N
, (1)
with pa+pc+pbn = 1. Each election can then be represented by a point in the simplex pa+pc+pbn = 1,
as illustrated on Fig. 2. Since the number of Blank and Null is typically small, clearly most points lie
near the edge pbn = 0. A second basic observation is that there is a wide dispersion along the axis pa−pc.
Figure 3 shows the scatter plot of (pa, pbn) for French elections since 2000, and the 100 most populated
cities. This plot suggests that individual behavior cannot be explained by a sequential binary choice
(first to decide to vote or not, and if yes, then to decide to cast a valid vote or not), since this would
lead to the absence of correlations between pa and pbn. Hence the electoral involvement should be viewed
through the three possibilities available to the voters: abstention, blank/null votes and votes according
to the list of choices. Moreover, Figure 3 shows that, if there are statistical regularities, they can be seen
by considering a convex function of the variables pa, pbn. This is what we do below, making use of the
entropy function associated to the three quantities pa, pc and pbn.
Previous work [22] has revealed statistical regularities from election to election, and from country to
country, when considering the distribution of turnout over municipalities. More precisely, the distribution
of the logarithmic turnout rate, τ ≡ ln(1−pa
pa
), centered on its mean value, is remarkably stable over time
and across countries for the most populated cities. Similarly, a logarithmic three choices value can be
defined, τ3 = ln
(
pc·pbn
(pa)2
)
, for which, the same type of regularities can be observed when considering polling
stations within municipalities (see Appendix S1, Section D.1). In addition, this analysis of fluctuations
confirms the remark in the preceding paragraph, that individual behavior is not well explained by a
sequential binary choice (see Appendix S1, Section D.2). However, this analysis of fluctuations does not
say anything on the mean values. In this paper, we exhibit another type of regularities, by considering an
adequate function (τ3 has not the appropriate convex properties), and focusing on the values themselves,
not only the fluctuations around the means.
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The involvement entropy
We introduce a variable whose value, as we will argue, is appropriate for characterizing the mean civic
involvement of the electorate. Viewing the three ratios {pa, pc, pbn} as probabilities, it is interesting to
associate to each election, instead of these three numbers, a single scalar characterizing the probability
distribution itself. One natural quantity associated to a probability distribution is the entropy, S, defined
by
S(pa, pc, pbn) = −pa log(pa)− pc log(pc)− pbn log(pbn). (2)
Here, and throughout this paper, log means base-two logarithm (log(2) = 1, and the entropy is said to
be in units of bits).
Within the framework of Information Theory, where it is called the Shannon entropy, this quantity
can be understood as a measure of missing information, or of average surprise, associated to the studied
random process [25]. In the context of Statistical Physics, it is the Boltzmann-Gibbs entropy measuring
the degree of ‘disorder’ of the system under consideration [26]. In the present context, we will refer to S
as the entropy of civic involvement, or “involvement entropy”, and consider it as a measure of disorder
vs. order in the civic involvement at a collective level. Indeed, it is a ‘macroscopic’ or collective measure
about the civic involvement of an electorate, and not the measure of the civic mobilization of individual
citizen – i.e., we do not claim that it corresponds to the behavior of a representative citizen. It can
be measured at any scale of aggregate data, e.g. for a municipality, a province, or a whole country.
For instance, the involvement entropy of a municipality, S, is given by Eq. (2) where the three ratios
{pa, pc, pbn} are the ratios of, respectively, the number abstentionists, Na, valid votes, Nc, and blank and
null votes Nbn, over the total number N of registered voters in the considered municipality.
Let us explain more what we mean by ‘order/disorder’, and how this is reflected by the entropy value.
We consider that a civic involvement shows an ‘ordered’ state if one of the three ratios is very close to
one (hence the two others very small). A ‘disordered’ state corresponds to having all three ratios of
similar values. Within this viewpoint, no particular role or importance is assigned to any one of the
three possible cases, abstention, blank/null, valid vote. The involvement entropy S, a positive or null
quantity, provides a well defined way to quantify the degree of disorder: the larger the entropy, the larger
the disorder. The maximum order is obtained when one of the ratios is equal to unity (and then the two
others are equal to zero), in which case S = 0. In contrast, the maximum disorder corresponds to an
equipartition of these 3 ratios, that is pc = pa = pbn = 1/3, in which case the entropy takes its maximal
possible value, S = log(3) ≃ 1.58.
As an illustration, consider the elections for the Mayor in the French municipalities. It is well known
(at least in France) that participation to elections in small municipalities is typically larger than in large
cities, for social reasons – for instance, in small municipalities where everyone knows every one else,
not going to the polling station will become common knowledge. Such social enforcement of the civic
involvement might be at the root of an increase of the number of abstentionists with population size: the
ratio pa of abstentionists is typically very low for small municipalities, and increases with the municipality
size, N . One then expects an increase of the involvement entropy with municipality-size: this is indeed
what we observe for the elections for the 2001 and 2008 first round (elections for which we have the
data for all the municipalities), as illustrated on Fig. 4. We can say that the electorate is very “ordered”
(in terms of its civic involvement) for low municipality-size, and gets more “disordered” with increasing
N . This involvement entropy increase is observed until a threshold population size value, at which the
electoral rule changes: the citizen has a larger number of possible voting choices in municipalities with
a number of inhabitants smaller than 3500, than in more populated municipalities. (It is allowed for
citizens living in municipalities with less than 3500 inhabitants, to combine candidates from different
opposite lists, or to add new names from citizens who are not officially candidates.) Remarkably, above
this critical size, the involvement entropy becomes essentially independent of the population size: one
has a plateau, at S slightly above 1, despite variations in pa, pc and pbn. As we will see throughout
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this paper, this particular value of involvement entropy, S ≈ 1, shows up as a typical value in modern
elections for most populated cities.
Let us give other illustrations. A great order of the electorate is provided by: (1) the population of
registered voters is highly polarized: there is an important difference between pa and pc (pa ≪ pc or
pa ≫ pc); and (2) blank and/or null votes are very few, that is pbn is very small. Such cases of small
entropies are, e.g., the 2002 Austrian Chamber of Deputies election for which pa ≃ 0.17, pc ≃ 0.81,
pbn ≃ 0.011 and S ≃ 0.73; the 2009 European Parliament election in Romania, with pa ≃ 0.81, pc ≃ 0.18,
pbn ≃ 0.008 and S ≃ 0.73. Conversely, a great disorder of the electorate results from: (1) the population
of registered voters is not very polarized, that is pa and pc are not very different; and (2) blank and/or null
votes are relatively important, that is pbn is not too small. For instance, the 2010 Austrian Presidential
election has pa ≃ 0.48, pc ≃ 0.49, pbn ≃ 0.034 and S ≃ 1.16; and the 2006 European Parliament election
in Italy has pa ≃ 0.29, pc ≃ 0.66, pbn ≃ 0.053 and S ≃ 1.11. Note that these values come from great
town values (see the SI, Tab. S1), whereas S is more spread out in small municipalities (see Fig. 5).
Finally, one finds that the involvement entropy S has a value frequently very near 1.0. For example, the
2008 Canadian Chamber of deputies election, the 2000 French referendum, the 1995 French second round
Presidential, and the 2003 and 2006 Mexican Chamber of deputies elections (see Fig. 2 and Tab. S1 in
the SI). In all these examples, despite an important diversity in pa values, S lies within 1.01 and 1.04,
showing that the electorate polarization is somewhat halfway between order and disorder. Note that
S = 1 is the entropy associated to the tossing of a fair coin. In the present context, it would be exactly
obtained for elections with pa = pc = 50% and pbn = 0.
Results
Stylized fact: The common occurrence of S ≈ 1
We have computed the involvement entropy S for all the elections of our data set, at different scales.
First we find that, most often, it depends on the municipality-size N . To analyze this size dependency,
we spread out municipalities data over samples with respect to the municipality population-size. In each
sample, municipalities have roughly the same number of registered voters. The number of municipalities
per sample is of order 100, except for France in which case this number is 200 (because France has much
more municipalities than the other countries studied in this paper). We denote by S the average over
all municipalities inside a sample of the involvement entropy S. This average S is plotted in Fig. 5 as a
function of the number of registered voters, N .
In this paper, X means the average value of the considered value, X , over all municipalities, around
100, or 200 for France, in a given sample where municipalities have roughly the same number of registered
voters, N ; e.g. S, pa, pbn, etc. Average values and standard-deviations do not take into account extreme
values in order to remove some electoral errors, etc. Electoral values greater than 5 sigma are not taken
into account. For instance let 100 municipalities of size≈ N (as in Fig. 5), each one has a civic involvement
entropy Si (i = 1, 2, ..., 100). First, 〈S〉 and σ are the average value and the standard-deviation of S over
these 100 municipalities. Next, the final average value S and the final standard-deviation over this sample
of 100 municipalities are only evaluated for municipalities, i, such that |Si − 〈S〉| < 5 σ.
Let us give the 1995 French second round Presidential election (Fr-1995-P2) as an example. A rela-
tively ordered civic electorate involvement is observed for the smallest population-size municipalities, with
S ≃ 0.7. The mean involvement entropy then increases with municipality size, for sizes up to N ∼ 10000.
For the most populated municipalities, that is above this threshold value in population-size, a satura-
tion occurs: the (average) civic disorder of the electorate becomes independent of municipality-size, with
S ≈ 1.
Next we consider the time evolution of the involvement entropy at a large scale (country, province,
canton, etc.). When the scale of aggregate data is lower than the national one, each value of the in-
6
volvement entropy for one election is equal to a weighted (by population-size) mean value of involvement
entropies at lower scale (province, canton, etc.). (See Appendix S1, Section A, and Tab. S2 in the SI
for more details.) Fig. S1 in the SI plots the involvement entropy of each election at large scale, for
each country over all elections (according to its nature) as a function of time, and Fig. S2 in the SI
shows how pa and pbn evolve in time for Chamber of Deputies election in each country. Nevertheless a
rapid evolution in time of S can be seen in a different way. First, for each country, elections are ordered
according to their year; half of them, the more ancient ones, are gathered into one group, and the other
half, the more recent ones, are gathered into another group. Next, we aggregate over countries, the
“old” elections on one side, the “recent” ones on the other, getting a total of 321 elections split into two
groups with roughly the same number of elections in each one. Although recency is here country specific,
the aggregated group of recent elections corresponds more or less to those occurred since the 70s. The
histograms of the involvement entropy S are compared for these two groups on Fig. 6. The histogram
for the group of the more recent elections shows a sharp peak at S ≈ 1, whereas the group of the older
elections has a broad distribution. This temporal evolution occurs in parallel with a significant decrease
of “highly ordered” elections (in the civic involvement point of view). In other words, nowadays there are
few elections with a small civic involvement entropy, S (say e.g. S . 0.8), but there are a lot of elections
with S ≈ 1.
Finally, Fig. 7 shows, for all the European Parliament Elections, how the involvement entropy of
municipalities depends on population-size (like in Fig. 5), and the time evolution at the national or
provincial scale (like Fig. S1 in the SI).
What the common occurrence is
As already said, Fig. 5 shows the remarkable fact that, for each studied country, in modern elections
the involvement entropy of highly populated municipalities is very frequently roughly equal to 1. This
common value, S ≈ 1, for high population-size municipalities is particularly striking when one looks at
European Parliament Elections (see Fig. 7-a). See also Table 2 for a rapid overview and basic statistics
per country about involvement entropies and population size of the ≈ 100 most populated municipalities.
There are however noticeable exceptions, notably the Italian case on which we will come back later
(Section Discussion). In any case, we have now to better specify what we mean by S ≈ 1 and show more
quantitatively in which way it is a common property of modern elections. This is done by gathering data
over all elections after 2000 (after 2000 in order to take into account evolution in time of the involvement
entropy as stressed by Fig. 6 and Tab. 2). Fig. 8-d plots the resulting histograms of the involvement
entropy restricted to ≈ 100 most populated municipalities, for different countries or ensemble of countries.
Moreover, Fig. 9 shows respectively the minimal length interval of S, pa, pc and pbn which contain 50%
of events (those plotted in Fig. 8-d). These two figures show a common sharp peak at a value of S
close to 1. The involvement entropy appears to be mainly in the range 0.98 . S . 1.08, which can
be taken as the definition of S ≈ 1 in this paper. Note that this definition is applied to the most
populated municipalities. At large scale, the involvement entropy depends on the the way that data are
aggregated (at national, province, etc. scale), and it is a little bit greater than S for the most populated
municipalities. Nevertheless the involvement entropy measure at large scale approximately reflects how
the most populated municipalities do, because an important ratio of population live in the ≈ 100 most
populated municipalities (as seen in Tab. 2).
It is important to stress that the common occurrence S ≈ 1 appears (1) as a property of high populated
municipalities, (2) and also in a recent time. See Fig. 6, or Fig. S1 in the SI, as an indication of the
latter point. For the first point, Fig. 8 shows the histograms of the entropy for different municipality
sizes. Compared with histograms of the most populated municipalities (Fig. 8-d), histograms of lower
municipality-size appear: (1) much less peaked (apart from Polish elections), and (2) not peaked at the
same common-value. Moreover, it is only for the larger sizes that all the histograms become very similar,
suggesting the convergence to a universal histogram at large sizes. Let us bear in mind (cf. Tab. 2) that
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the sample of the ≈ 100 most populated municipalities in Austria is, on average, much less populated than
the ones of the four other countries or ensemble or countries. (Taking into account the ≈ 50 Austrian
municipalities per sample provides, for the most populated sample, an histogram of S much centered
on S ≈ 1 than the one of ≈ 100 municipalities (see Fig. S3 in the SI).) In other words, the Austrian
sample of the ≈ 100 most populated municipalities is not so comparable to the four other ones, and
does not accurately reflect a typical behavior in large populated municipalities (especially since the civic
involvement can significantly depend on the population size as it is shown in Fig. 5). Lastly, the choice of
the number (here 100) of most populated municipalities is only for statistical convenience and does not
affect the results (see e.g. Fig. S3 in the SI which is similar to the Fig. 8-d, but for the sample of 50 or
200 most populated municipalities).
Now, let us better quantify this sharp and common peak for the most populated municipalities.
First, Fig. 10-a plots the smallest distance (Ssup − Smin), such that 50% of events are included into the
set [Sinf , Ssup], with respect to the relative municipality size. This confirms that (apart from Polish
elections) distributions of S get more peaked when the population size increase, and specifically for
the most populated municipalities. (The same features also appear by considering minimal distances
which contain 25% or 10% of events. This is in agreement of the robustness of this trivial method.)
Moreover (apart from the Austrian elections) the minimal distance (Ssup −Smin) appears to converge to
a common value, this only for the most populated sample (see also Fig. 9 for Sinf and Ssup for this latter
sample). Next, in order to quantify the common peak phenomenon, we calculate the overlap between
distributions of S for municipalities as a function of the relative population size (see Fig. 10-b). The
overlap between n distributions of S, with probability density functions (pdf) fi(S), i = 1, 2, · · · , n,
is defined as On =
∫
min
[
f1(S), f2(S), · · · , fn(S)
]
dS . Fig. 10-b shows an increasing overlap between
distributions when the population size increases, and specifically for the most populated municipalities.
This confirms that the distributions of S get more and more similar as the relative municipality-size
increases, with (sharp) peaks becoming identical for the most populated municipalities.
What the common occurrence is not
We claim that this common most frequent value, S ≈ 1 for the most populated municipalities, is not a
mere statistical artefact. More precisely, we claim that:
(1) it is not a direct consequence of the law of large numbers, which, for data aggregated at the scale
of large municipalities, would give a systematic result;
(2) it is not a result of ‘pure chance’, that is a bias in the data due to random events, or an accidental
bias in the collected data;
(3) it does not only result from having pa and pc neither around 50% nor around a common value:
there is a wide range of pa values for which S ≈ 1 is observed;
(4) it does not result from having a small proportion of Blank and Null Votes.
In support of the two first points, we show below that there are robust properties which cannot be
explained by the pure chance or the large number hypotheses. About the two last points concerning the
ranges of pa and pbn values, we show that, even if the distributions of S could be peaked for a relatively
broad distribution of pa and small values of pbn, this, (1), cannot alone explain why the distributions of S
for the most populated towns are so much narrowed and, (2), in addition, have their peak at a common
value of S. The next three sections detail these claims.
Against a randomness or large number artefact
We note three facts that goes against a pure chance or large number hypotheses.
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(i) S ≈ 1 is specific to modern elections. Indeed (apart from Swiss Votations discussed in Section
Discussion) this common value S ≈ 1 appears recently, and at different times for different countries –
and different elections –: in the 70’s or 80’s in France, 80’s in Germany, 90’s in Canada, 2000’s in Czech
Republic, etc (cf. Fig. S1 in the SI). Moreover, there is no systematic way in which recent convergence
to S ≈ 1 appears in time. S ≈ 1 may be reached as well from inferior values (e.g. Chamber of
Deputies elections in Canada, Czech Republic, etc., in Fig. 7-b) than from superior values (e.g. European
Parliament in France in Fig. 7-b). Lastly, in a given country, some kind of elections provide at large scale
S ≈ 1 since their coming (e.g. European Parliament elections ), and for some other ones, S ≈ 1 seems
(actually) to be an attractor point in time (see e.g. Chamber of Deputies elections in Canada, Czech
Republic, France, Switzerland, etc. in the SI, Fig. S1).
(ii) S ≈ 1 is only observed for large populations (and there is no common-value for smaller municipality
sizes) as it is shown in Fig. 10; and there is sometimes a plateau with a lower value of N which both
depend on the election and on the country (e.g. ≈ 3000 in Canada and Czech Republic, 10000 in France
for referendums, etc., in Fig. 5). Moreover, there is no systematic way in which convergence to S ≈ 1
occurs as the population size increases. S ≈ 1 may be reached as well from inferior values (e.g. Fr-1995-
P2, Sp-2004-E and Sp-2009-E) than from superior values (e.g. Fr-2000-R, Ge-2004-E and Ge-2009-E in
Fig. 5). Lastly, S ≈ 1 may be reached from a discontinuous transition when voting rule (which depends
on the population size of municipalities) changes. This occurs for the two French local elections for the
Mayor (see Fig. 4), which are the only one elections of our database where there is this electoral rule
change.
(iii) The shape of distributions of S for large municipality sizes does not result from a statistical
bias due to large numbers: creating artificial high populated municipalities, by means of aggregating
large amount of citizen choices who live in small and different municipalities, does clearly not yield a
distribution peaked near S ≈ 1 (see Appendix S1, Section C, and Fig. S6 in the SI for more details).
Finite-size-effects, that is the effect of aggregating data at different scales, are considered more thor-
oughly in Appendix S1, Section C, comparing ballot box scale with municipality scale. This section also
discusses more the issue of statistical effects that could be due to large numbers.
Ranges of variation of pa and pbn
On one side, while pbn does not radically change in time at large scales, pa has increased during last
decades in most countries (see e.g. insets of Fig. 6 and Fig. S2 in the SI). On the other side, pbn is known
to decrease when the population-size of municipalities N increases, as it was discussed in the Section
Introduction. Let us thus first consider the possibility that the common occurrence S ≈ 1 could be a
consequence of these two facts: pa is not too small (for example, if pa . 0.227, then it is no more possible
to get S = 1) and, independently, pbn is small.
We give three arguments against this assertion. (i) First, we plot on Fig. 11-a histograms of S resulting
from a flat and broad distribution of pa, and a flat distributions of pbn (with small values). Each histogram
corresponds to a different choice of the range of (small) pbn values. To better understand this point, let
S2(pa) = −pa log(pa) − (1 − pa) log(1 − pa) which has a maximal value, S2 = 1, for pa = 0.5. Moreover,
when pbn = 0, S2 is equal to the involvement entropy, S defined in Eq. (2), i.e. S2(pa) = S(pa, pbn = 0).
Hence, relatively small variations of pa around 0.5 and very small values of pbn lead to S ≃ 1.) The result
is indeed a set of peaked histograms. However, these distributions of S are neither necessarily centered
on S ≈ 1 nor centered at a common peak.
(ii) Second, we emphasis the specificity of most populated municipalities. Fig. 11-b plots for French
data (where the tested phenomenon is clearer) distributions of S selecting elections for which pbn belongs
to specific ranges of values. Moreover theses distributions are also plotted according to the population-
size of municipalities. It is only for the most populated municipalities that the distributions of S for
different ranges of pbn are roughly peaked at the same value S ≈ 1 (with a very good agreement for
pbn ∈ [0, 0.01[ and pbn ∈ [0.01, 0.02[). Moreover, for a lower population-size, e.g. with a relative rank of
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90%, it is interesting to note that distributions of S for different ranges of pbn (apart from the pbn ≥ 0.03)
share the same features as in Fig. 11-a, i.e. distributions are peaked in different values. (To have a more
detailed view, Fig. S5 in the SI shows scatter-plots (pa, pbn) for the municipalities taken into account in
Fig. 11-b.).
(iii) Third, there is actually a wide disparities in the ranges of pa and pbn between different countries
or group of countries. One can see in Fig. 9 how, (1), France and, (2), all countries without At, Fr,
Ge and Pl, can reach the common S peak, despite largely different ranges of pa, pc and pbn. In other
words, the ranges of ratios pa, pc and pbn are not sufficiently similar between countries or ensemble of
countries to explain why the distributions of S for the most populated municipalities share a sharp peak
at a common value of S.
Implied correlations between pa and pbn
Hence, it seems difficult to explain the common value S ≈ 1 for the most populated towns as a consequence
of having independently pbn small and pa in a given particular range. The observation of a common peak
around S ≈ 1 thus implies the existence of specific correlations between pa and pbn.
To test this conclusion, we consider surrogate data obtained by reshuffling the ratios pbn from one
municipality (or country) to another one, while pa is kept unchanged (and then pc is deduced from
pc = 1 − pa − pbn). Note that the marginal distributions of pa and pbn remain unchanged by this
reshuffling procedure, whereas their correlations are destroyed. We use this method twice: first, (i)
contrasting recent and old elections, and second, (ii), considering the dependency in municipality size. In
the following, reshuffling results are shown as average values over 1000 realizations, and the corresponding
standard-deviations are plotted as error bars.
(i) Figure 12 shows, at national scale and for two periods of time, how the distributions of S change
under this reshuffling. pbn are reshuffled within the same group of elections. For the first period in time,
the real distribution of S, which is not peaked near S ≈ 1, and the surrogate one are not very different
between themselves. By contrast, the distributions are notably different for the second period. Moreover,
the main difference concerns the peak near S ≈ 1. The peak of the surrogate data distribution is less
sharp than the one of the real data. This is particularly interesting since pbn is roughly distributed in
the same manner between the two relative periods in time (see insets of Fig. 6 or scatter-plots (pa, pbn)
of Fig. S4 in the SI). The widening of the surrogate distribution of involvement entropy near the peak
S ≈ 1 can be seen as a sign that there are correlations between pa and pbn which enforces the occurrence
of S ≈ 1.
(ii) From a qualitative point of view, the reshuffled data have a peak of S values which is less narrow
than for the real ones, a discrepancy which increases with municipality size, as can be seen for the French
data on the inset of Fig. 10-a, and on the scatter-plots (pa, pbn) on Fig. S5 in the SI. In addition, the
distributions of S obtained for the reshuffled data are not as well peaked at a common value as it is the case
for the real data ones. Quantitatively, for the French data, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov distance between
the distributions of real and reshuffled data is significantly larger for the most populated municipalities,
with a distance that allows one to reject the hypothesis that the two distributions are similar (indeed
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov distance is then 3.0± 0.2, while 1.6 corresponds to ≈ 1% probability that the
two distributions coincide). Moreover, Fig. 10-b shows that overlaps between different distributions of S
resulting from reshuffled pbn is smaller than for real data, and this only when municipality-sizes are high,
or even only for the most populated municipality sample: the reshuffling suppresses the high increase of
overlaps which is observed on real data for the sample of the most populated municipalities.
We can thus conclude that there is a specific property for the most populated municipalities, which
is not encapsulated by considering pa and pbn as independent variables.
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Discussion
We suggest that the common value S ≈ 1 of the entropy, which appears recently in high populated
municipalities, reveals an emerging collective behavioral norm characteristic of citizen involvement in
modern democracies, and we propose to call it a ‘weak law’ on recent electoral behavior among urban
voters. Signs of existence of this possible norm can not only be seen notably by the greatest density
value of the involvement entropy S around ≈ 1, whatever countries, type of elections, etc., but also by
its deviances. There are two kinds of deviances: for the fist one, S is small (which generally occurs when
pa or pc is very small), for the second one, S is high (which generally results from great ratio of blank
or null votes, pbn). We will see that these deviances are associated with a particular phenomena of civic
involvement, or are simply reduced to the norm (i.e S ≈ 1) when the meaning of blank votes changes.
When significantly smaller values are observed (e.g. S . 0.85) for cities, something appear inside
towns (in average): the heterogeneity of involvement entropy over all polling stations of a given town
decreases when S of the whole city decreases. In other words, considering the electorate civic involvement
in a given town, the less is S for the whole town, the more the town appears homogeneous (i.e. involvement
entropies, at polling station scale, over all polling stations of the town are more homogeneous between
themselves). Section E in Appendix S1 shows this point (free of statistical bias), particularly clear when
the ratio pc is high (compared to cases where pa are high). This civic involvement phenomenon for towns
with small S can be seen as a signature of something ‘new’ which appears when deviance of the norm
occurs.
On the other hand, elections where significantly S > 1, typically corresponds to cases where there
has been an appeal (from political parties, citizens blogs, etc.) to vote blank or null, which adds civic-
involvement ‘tensions’ to the election. It is remarkable that countries which make the distinction between
blank votes to null votes, provide, by considering blank votes like the valid votes in favor of one of the list
of choices, a modified involvement entropy S′ ≈ 1 whenever the involvement entropy is S > 1. (When
blank votes are grouped with votes according to the list of choices, the modified involvement entropy S′
is equal to S(pa, pc + pb, pn) in Eq. (2), and not S(pa, pc, pb + pn) as for the usual involvement entropy,
where pb, pn and pbn = pb + pn mean respectively ratios of blank votes, null votes and blank or null
votes.) See the striking plateau in Fig. 13 for Swiss referendums, which shows a modified involvement
entropy S′ ≈ 1 when S > 1. Moreover, Section F in Appendix S1 clearly shows this point, e.g. for
European Parliament elections in Italy, and for Referendums in Spain. Hence the fact that S > 1 boils
down to a modified involvement entropy ≈ 1, by categorizing blank votes as Valid Votes, can be seen as
the recovering of the ‘weak law’ by the decrease of civic involvement ‘tensions’. The fact that a deviance
of the norm is naturally reduced to the norm (the involvement entropy is around 1) as soon as blank votes
are grouped with ‘valid votes’ can be seen not as an haphazardly occurrence but rather as a signature of
the norm in a larger sense.
Now let us comment about the use of the term ‘weak law’. In one hand, the common value S ≈ 1
(for the most populated municipalities in recent times) appears as a kind of law of a phenomenon not yet
measured up to now. This phenomenon concerns the involvement of the electorate, from a civic point of
view. A kind of law, because it occurs very frequently, with strong regularities despite wide disparities
across elections. As we have seen, it implies the existence of particular correlations between pa and pbn.
In other hand, this is clearly not a ‘hard’ or ‘strong’ law since noticeable deviations are observed. One
cannot exclude that a ‘strong’ law exists, encapsulating more regularities for the most populated mu-
nicipalities (e.g. by taking into account not only pa, pbn and pc, but also parameters characterizing the
political context, the number of valid votes for different choices, etc.). Such more global law might explain
why S ≈ 1 appears in recent times and why this phenomenon is not observed for small municipalities. In
any case, we believe that this weak law of recent urban civic involvement shows up as a consequence of
some robust electoral behavior. As one more illustration, Swiss referendums show (at the canton scale)
S ≈ 1 with small fluctuations, and this from 1880s to nowadays (see Fig. 14).
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To conclude, the main finding of this work, based on the analysis of a wide number of elections from
11 different countries, is that a common stylized fact emerges: in recent elections, the distribution of the
involvement entropy is found to be sharply peaked near S ≈ 1, in high populated municipalities (and thus
also at national levels). This universal property is remarkable given the wide disparities across countries
(and even within countries for different elections) in political mores, voting systems, in the way that lists
of registered voters are established (on a voluntary basis or automatically, etc.), and so on.
Moreover, S ≈ 1 appears to be very stable in time whenever it occurs for one kind of election, as for
example European Parliament elections in Western Europe, and particularly remarkably for the Swiss
referendums since 1884. We propose to designate this strong regularity, neither a ‘hard law’ nor a mere
statistical artefact, as a ‘weak law’ of electoral involvement characteristic of modern democracies in urban
cities. We suggest that the existence of this weak law is the signature of an emerging collective behavioral
norm. More studies and analysis would be necessary in order to better understand its conditions of
realizations and its meaning (at the individual scale and/or at macro scale). Moreover, it should be very
interesting for forthcoming studies, notably to know if this ‘weak law’ also occurs in emergent countries,
in new democratic countries, in great cities (whatever they are), etc.
The present study calls for a different point of view than those commonly used in Political Sciences.
We do not work within the classical paradigm explaining the electoral behavior with sociological or ethnic
even institutional or rational choice variables. Our propose is to change perspective of observation, using
very large sets of data, looking for regularities – stylized facts –, without restricting the analysis to a
particular category which could be based on chronology, space, institutional or national specificities. At
a ‘macro’ level, using aggregated data, and not at the individual scale, this new view point focuses on (1)
the involvement or the mobilization of the electorate, and (2) a measure of heterogeneity or, otherwise
stated, of order and disorder. The question asked here to electoral data is not why a more or less rational
citizen participates or not to an election, but how is the degree of disorder of civic involvement of the
electorate.
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Figure Legends
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Figure 1. Electoral mobilization: categorization of registered voters according to their
voting behavior. The latter may result from either two sequential binary decisions (left),
or two mutually exclusive binary decisions (right), or (see Appendix S1, Section D.2, for a
discussion).
S = 0.6
S = 0.8
S = 1.0
S = 1.05
S = 1.2
S = 1.4
At-2002-D
Ro-2009-E
At-2010-P
It-2004-E
Ca-2008-D
Fr-2000-R
Fr-1995-P2
Mx-2003-D
Mx-2006-D
p
a
 = 1 
c
 = 1
p
bn
 = 1
Figure 2. Simplex pa + pc + pbn = 1, in which any given election, for the most populated
municipalities, can be represented by a point, as illustrated by the symbols corresponding to particular
elections of our data set (see Appendix S1, Section A, for details). The continuous curves are lines of
constant involvement entropy value, drawn for values ranging from S = 0.6 to S = 1.4. See text for
At-2002-D, Ro-2009-E, At-2010-P and It-2004-E. For Ca-2008-D: pa ≃ 0.49, pc ≃ 0.51, pbn ≃ 0.003 and
S ≃ 1.02; for Fr-2000-R: pa ≃ 0.71, pc ≃ 0.25, pbn ≃ 0.036 and S ≃ 1.02; for Fr-1995-P2: pa ≃ 0.23,
pc ≃ 0.73, pbn ≃ 0.044 and S ≃ 1.01; for Mx-2003-D: pa ≃ 0.59, pc ≃ 0.40, pbn ≃ 0.013 and S ≃ 1.04;
and for Mx-2006-D: pa ≃ 0.40, pc ≃ 0.58, pbn ≃ 0.012 and S ≃ 1.04.
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Figure 3. Scatter plot of (pa, pbn) of the 100 most populated French cities over elections
since 2000. The convex function S (here S = 1.03) is also plotted as a guide view.
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Figure 4. Average values S of the involvement entropy of municipalities, S, as a function of
the number of registered voters N , for the first round of Mayor elections in France. There
are two kinds of voting rules, which depend on the population-size more or less than 3500 inhabitants
(see text). Inset shows average values of pa, pc and pbn as a function of N for the 2008 municipales
elections (which lead for high population municipalities to a plateau of S despite variations in pa, pc
and pbn). For each N , average values, S, pa, pc, pbn, are evaluated over ≈ 200 municipalities of size ≈ N .
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Figure 5. Mean values S of the involvement entropy for municipalities, as a function of
the number of registered voters N . Each point results from an average over a sample of ≈ 100
(200 for France) municipalities of size ≈ N . Italian graph inset shows a variant of S where Blank Votes
are grouped with Valid Votes (see Appendix S1, Section F, for a deeper discussion). See the Appendix
S1, Section A, for more details on the data.
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Figure 6. Evolution in time of involvement entropy, S, at large scale (national, provincial,
etc.) of 321 elections (see Appendix S1, Section A, for more details), apart from Swiss referendums. For
each country, electoral results are equally divided into two groups: those which occurred at the first
period in time and at the second one. Histograms of S (and pa, pc and pbn in the insets) show the
involvement entropy of the first and second group over all countries. Fig. S1 in the SI plots for each
country the whole of elections, and also Fig. S4 in the SI for scatter plots (pa, pbn) of these elections,
but at national aggregate scale.
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Figure 7. Mean involvement entropy for European Parliament elections. Fig. 7-a (left panel):
same elections as those shown in Fig. 5; here for all countries, including France, averages are over ∼ 100
municipalities. Fig. 7-b (right panel): same elections as those shown in Fig. S1 in the SI; the vertical
dashed line indicates the year of the abolishment of compulsory voting in Italy. Here, Italian Blank
Votes, Nb, (but not Null Votes, Nn) are grouped with votes in favor of lists of candidates (see Appendix
S1, Section F, for more discussion).
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Figure 8. Histograms of involvement entropy, S, with respect to the relative
municipality-size bin over all analyzed since 2000. There are 12 French elections, 7 Austrian
elections, 11 Polish elections, 7 German elections and 24 for others countries (included in one curve,
with no more than 4 elections per country). Municipalities of each country are divided into bins (of
≈ 100 municipalities) with respect to their municipality-size (see e.g. Fig. 5). For instance, ‘Rank 25%’
(Fig. 8-a) means the bin whose population-size rank is the twenty-fifth per cent with regard to the
sample of the most populated municipalities (Fig. 8-d) of the considered country. Insets: histograms of
corresponding pa, pc and pbn. S = 0.98 and S = 1.08 are plotted in dashed lines and all the scales axis
are similar from one plot to another one.
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pa, pc and pbn of the 100 most populated municipalities over all elections since 2000. See Fig. 8-d for
the related histograms.
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Figure 10. Quantitative evidence of the sharp and common peak of S for the most
populated municipalities. Considered elections, the way that bins are ranked, countries or groups of
countries and legends are the same as in Fig. 8. Left (10-a): Minimal interval (Ssup − Sinf ), which
encapsulates 50% of events, with respect to the relative population size. Right (10-b): Overlap O4
between 4 distributions of S of municipalities as a function of their relative municipality-size (see text
for the definition of On). The inset shows in the same manner overlap O3 between 3 distributions of S
((1): all without At, Fr, Ge and Pl; (2): Fr; (3): Pl). Some curves obtained from reshuffling pbn of
municipalities (inside one country or ensemble of countries), while pa is not modified, are also plotted.
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Figure 11. Relative importance of pbn on the distribution of S. Left (11-a): Distribution of S
from flat distributions of pa (where pa ∈ [0.3; 0.7]) and pbn. The pdf of S can be peaked for a relatively
broad distribution of pa and a small range of pbn, but the peak of the distribution of S, which depends
on pbn values, is not necessarily centered on S ≈ 1. Histogram of S over the ≈ 100 French most
populated municipalities (the same as in Fig. 8-d) is also given as a guiding view. Right (11-b): pdf of
S, for different ranges of pbn, over ≈ 100 French municipalities, which depend on their relative
population-size (like in Fig. 8-b, c, d). Histograms of S(pa, pbn) from reshuffled pa, while pbn remain
unchanged, are also given.
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Figure 12. Relative importance of reshuffling pbn on S. Analyzed elections and the manner that
elections are divided into two groups are the same than in Fig. 6. Nevertheless, here, each election is
aggregated at national scale, i.e. S is directly evaluated from the set {pa, pc, pbn} at the national scale.
In these figures, surrogate S(pa, pbn) data, consist in reshuffling pbn from one election to another one in
the same group, while pa is not modified. Surrogate curves result from the average of 1000 realizations,
and standard-deviations are plotted as error bars.
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Figure 13. A modified involvement entropy, S′, where Blank Votes are grouped with Valid
Votes, with respect to the involvement entropy S, for ≈ 500 Swiss referendums. (See Appendix
S1, Section F, for a deeper discussion.) Each point corresponds to the average of about 10 referendums.
Note the plateau S′ ≈ 1 for S & 1.05.
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Figure 14. Time evolution of the involvement entropy, S, of 531 Swiss referendums, at
large scale. Each point corresponds to the average (weighted by the number of registered voters) over
all Swiss cantons (25 or 26 in quantity). In red (as a guide view): average values over ≈10 referendums.
The inset show sames things, but for ratio of abstentionists, pa, and the rartio of blank and null votes,
pbn.
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Tables
At 13 1945 Ca* 5 1945 CH 3 1884 Cz 1 1990 Fr* 20 1946 Ge 7 1949
It 4 1946 Mx* 4 1991 Pl* 11 1990 Ro* 4 1990 Sp 4 1976
Table 1. Countries where elections are analyzed in this paper (first column). Number of
elections studied at the municipality scale (second column), and the date from which they are studied
at national or provincial scale (third column) – even if it is before the end of the compulsory voting in
Austria and in Italy. Star indicates that electoral data are also known at polling station level. Number
of municipalities per country: ≈ 2400 in Austria (At); ≈ 7700 in Canada (Ca); ≈ 2700 in Switzerland
(CH); ≈ 6400 in Czech Republic (Cz); ≈ 36000 in Metropolitan France (Fr); ≈ 12000 in Germany (Ge);
≈ 8100 in Italy (It); ≈ 2400 in Mexico (Mx); ≈ 2500 in Poland (Pl); ≈ 3200 in Romania (Ro); ≈ 8100
in Spain (Sp). See Appendix S1, Section A, for more details.
Ctry date nel Nmin N Nbin/NCtry S < 0.98 S ∈ [0.98, 1.08] 1.08 < S
t < 2000
Fr 8 32000 69000 18% 1 2 5
At 6 7000 26000 44% 3 3 0
Ca 1 30000 94000 48% 0 1 0
t ≥ 2000
Fr 12 33000 70000 17% 3 8 1
At 7 7000 27000 43% 3 3 1
Pl 11 39000 120000 39% 2 8 1
Ge 7 68000 190000 30% 3 4 0
Ca 4 53000 83000 38% 0 4 0
It 4 48000 150000 31% 2 0 2
Sp 4 48000 160000 47% 2 2 0
Mx 4 130000 370000 53% 0 3 1
Ro 4 20000 87000 47% 1 2 1
CH 3 7500 18000 37% 0 3 0
Cz 1 14000 36000 43% 0 1 0
Table 2. Basic information about the bin of the ≈100 most populated municipalities per
country (Ctry). nel means the number of elections analyzed. The municipality of this bin with the
lowest number of registered voters is written as Nmin; the average value of N over these municipalities,
as N ; and the ratio of registered voters which belongs to this bin over those in the whole country, as
Nbin/NCtry. S is classified according to values 0.98 and 1.08.
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A. Data
• Elections studied at municipality scale
Table S1 gives more details about the 76 elections studied in this paper at the municipality scale. There
are: 13 elections from Austria [1] (≈ 2400 municipalities) 1; 5 from Canada [2] (≈ 7700 municipalities);
1 from Czech Republic [3] (≈ 6400 municipalities); 20 from Metropolitan France [4] (≈ 36000 municipal-
ities); 7 from Germany [5] (≈ 12000 municipalities) 2; 4 from Italy [6] (≈ 8100 municipalities); 4 from
Mexico [7] (≈ 2400 municipalities) 3; 11 from Poland [8] (≈ 2500 municipalities) 4; 4 from Romania [9]
(≈ 3200 municipalities) 5 6, 4 from Spain [10] (≈ 8100 municipalities) and 3 from Switzerland [11] (≈ 2700
municipalities) 7.
Table S1 also gives basic statistics over the ≈ 100 (≈ 200 for France) most populated municipalities.
• Time evolution at the national or provincial scale
The study of time evolution of S is done for the same countries as in Tab. S1 and for all national elections
for which we have enough data. For Austria [12], the study considers data since 1945, even if compulsory
voting was abolished in the whole country in 1992 for National Council elections (D), and after 2004 for
Presidential elections (P) (but in 1982 some provinces had yet done it); for Canada [13], since 1945; for
Czech Republic [14], since 1990 8; for France [15], since 1945 9; for Germany [16], since 1949; for Italy [17],
since 1945 even if there were compulsory voting until 1993 10; for Mexico [18], since 1991; for Poland [19],
1Corrections due to wahlkarten or postal votes are taking account from the national level, i.e. in this paper, each
municipality receive from voting cards a number of votes and valid votes proportional to its number of population, and at
the same ratio for every municipality.
2Chamber of Deputies (D) elections refer to the German Bundestag elections. Land Parliament elections at time less or
equal to 2004 (or 2010) in each Land are written here as ‘2004 Ld’ (or ‘2010 Ld’). Postal votes (briehwahlen) are usually
taken account at Landkreis scale (they are distributed in municipalities, according to their populations), when it is it possible
to do it. Nevertheless, these corrections provide a very small difference in Fig. 5, especially for high population-size bins.
3The 2006 Senador election (not studied here) gives a very near statistics of S than the (P) and (D) elections that also
occur at the same time.
4The Chamber of Deputies (D) election is the Sejm Chamber election.
5The referendum studied here is about the reduction of the number of parliamentarians to a number of 300 persons,
and not about the adoption of a unicameral Parliament held on the same time. The latter one is not known at the polling
station level.
6Some Romanian electors, not registered in the lista electorala permanenta, are able to vote. For this country, we pursue
to write N the Number of Register Voters, Nv the registered electors who take part to the election, and Nbn the number
of Null and Blank Votes that the Registered Voters could make (even if the latter data is not known.) Romanian electoral
data gather for each municipality, N , Nv, Nv(tot) (the total number of votes), and Nbn(tot) the total number of Null
and Blank votes. Assuming that registered electors and not registered electors vote Null and Blank in the same way (i.e.
Nbn(tot)
Nv(tot)
= Nbn
Nv
), we deduce Nbn.
7The referendums or votations ‘R(a)’ and ‘R(b)’ respectively occurred the 11 of March and the 17 of June. The Legislative
(D) election refers to the Conseil National election.
8The 1990 and 1992 Deputies (D) elections only refer to the Parliamentary Chamber of People election. The Parliamen-
tary Chamber of Nations and the Parliamentary National Council elections, that occurred at the same day as the previous
ones, also gave approximately the same S value.
9All French electoral data are from metropolitan France. Some referendums are not known at the de´partement scale. In
these cases, S is evaluated at the national scale.
10We consider the only first question asked to electors in referendums.
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Id S pa pc pbn(pb) Id S pa pc pbn(pb)
Fr 1992 R 1.02±0.04 0.32 0.66 0.018 Fr 1993 D 1.09±0.04 0.34 0.63 0.028
Fr 1994 E 1.12±0.03 0.48 0.50 0.020 Fr 1995 P1 0.91±0.04 0.24 0.74 0.018
Fr 1995 P2 1.01±0.07 0.23 0.73 0.044 Fr 1997 D 1.08±0.03 0.36 0.62 0.024
Fr 1998 rg 1.11±0.03 0.46 0.52 0.019 Fr 1999 E 1.11±0.03 0.54 0.44 0.020
Fr 2000 R 1.02±0.07 0.71 0.25 0.036 Fr 2002 P1 1.01±0.04 0.31 0.67 0.019
Fr 2002 P2 0.95±0.07 0.21 0.75 0.035 Fr 2002 D 1.02±0.04 0.37 0.62 0.010
Fr 2004 rg 1.10±0.04 0.41 0.57 0.021 Fr 2004 E 1.04±0.03 0.57 0.42 0.010
Fr 2005 R 1.00±0.05 0.32 0.66 0.014 Fr 2007 P1 0.72±0.08 0.17 0.82 0.010
Fr 2007 P2 0.84±0.06 0.17 0.80 0.032 Fr 2007 D 1.04±0.03 0.42 0.57 0.009
Fr 2009 E 1.03±0.05 0.60 0.39 0.012 Fr 2010 rg 1.06±0.03 0.57 0.42 0.012
At 1994 D 0.81±0.11 0.20 0.78 0.016 At 1995 D 0.73±0.10 0.15 0.83 0.018
At 1996 E 1.04±0.04 0.33 0.65 0.021 At 1998 P 1.00±0.10 0.27 0.70 0.032
At 1999 E 1.06±0.05 0.52 0.46 0.013 At 1999 D 0.82±0.09 0.22 0.77 0.011
At 2002 D 0.73±0.10 0.17 0.81 0.011 At 2004 P 1.04±0.09 0.31 0.66 0.028
At 2004 E 1.03±0.05 0.59 0.40 0.010 At 2006 D 0.87±0.09 0.24 0.74 0.012
At 2008 D 0.88±0.08 0.24 0.75 0.014 At 2009 E 1.04±0.04 0.55 0.44 0.009
At 2010 P 1.16±0.06 0.48 0.49 0.034
Pl 2000 P1 0.98±0.03 0.36 0.63 0.006 Pl 2001 D 1.09±0.02 0.52 0.46 0.015
Pl 2003 R 0.98±0.02 0.37 0.62 0.004 Pl 2004 E 0.79±0.07 0.78 0.22 0.005
Pl 2005 D 1.06±0.03 0.58 0.41 0.013 Pl 2005 P1 1.02±0.01 0.49 0.51 0.003
Pl 2005 P2 1.03±0.01 0.47 0.53 0.006 Pl 2007 D 1.05±0.03 0.42 0.57 0.010
Pl 2009 E 0.87±0.06 0.73 0.27 0.004 Pl 2010 P1 1.01±0.02 0.43 0.57 0.004
Pl 2010 P2 1.03±0.02 0.43 0.56 0.007
Ge 2002 D 0.83±0.07 0.22 0.77 0.009 Ge 2004 Ld 1.02±0.04 0.41 0.58 0.007
Ge 2004 E 1.02±0.05 0.59 0.40 0.009 Ge 2005 D 0.87±0.06 0.24 0.75 0.011
Ge 2009 E 1.00±0.05 0.60 0.40 0.006 Ge 2009 D 0.95±0.05 0.30 0.69 0.009
Ge 2010 Ld 1.04±0.03 0.43 0.56 0.009
Ca 1997 D 1.00±0.04 0.37 0.62 0.009 Ca 2000 D 1.03±0.03 0.44 0.56 0.006
Ca 2004 D 1.02±0.02 0.46 0.54 0.004 Ca 2006 D 1.01±0.02 0.44 0.56 0.003
Ca 2008 D 1.02±0.02 0.49 0.51 0.003
It 2004 E 1.11±0.12 0.29 0.66 0.053(0.023) It 2006 D 0.78±0.13 0.17 0.81 0.020(0.007)
It 2008 D 0.89±0.12 0.20 0.77 0.027(0.008) It 2009 E 1.08±0.10 0.36 0.61 0.034(0.013)
Mx 2003 D 1.04±0.05 0.59 0.40 0.013 Mx 2006 D 1.04±0.04 0.40 0.58 0.012
Mx 2006 P 1.03±0.04 0.40 0.59 0.010 Mx 2009 D 1.11±0.06 0.56 0.41 0.027
Ro 2009 E 0.73±0.09 0.81 0.18 0.008 Ro 2009 R 1.09±0.02 0.55 0.44 0.017
Ro 2009 P1 1.05±0.02 0.52 0.48 0.008 Ro 2009 P2 1.04±0.02 0.50 0.50 0.006
Sp 2004 D 0.92±0.07 0.24 0.74 0.020(0.014) Sp 2004 E 1.01±0.06 0.57 0.42 0.006(0.003)
Sp 2008 D 0.91±0.08 0.26 0.73 0.013(0.009) Sp 2009 E 1.03±0.04 0.56 0.43 0.009(0.006)
CH 2007 R(a) 1.04±0.04 0.53 0.46 0.008(0.004) CH 2007 R(b) 0.99±0.06 0.62 0.37 0.007(0.004)
CH 2007 D 1.04±0.05 0.53 0.47 0.009(0.002)
Cz 2003 R 1.07±0.01 0.47 0.52 0.012
Table S1. Elections studied in this paper at the municipality scale. An election is identified
(Id) by its country, its year date and its nature. D: Chamber of Deputies election; E: European
parliament election; P: presidential election (according to the constitution of the country, in only one
round); P1 and P2: first and second round of a Presidential election; R: Referendum; Ld: German
La¨nder elections; rg: French Re´gionales elections. For each country elections are given in a
chronological order (but the 2006 Mexican Presidential (P) and Deputies (D) elections occurred the
same day, and also for the 2009 Romanian Presidential (P1) and Referendum (R) elections). Even if an
election needs two rounds, only the first one is considered (e.g. the French Deputies (D) and Re´gionales
(rg) elections) unless the contrary is indicated (e.g. P1 and P2). Mean values of S, pa, pc, pbn(and (pb)
if Blank Vote are distinguished between Null Vote), and also standard deviation only for S, are given
over the bin of the ≈ 100 (or ≈ 200 for France only) most populated municipalities. In bold text,
S ∈ [0.98; 1.08].
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Country Kind of elections Scale of aggregate data
At D, E, P, R National
Ca D Province (5-13)
CH D, R Canton (25-26)
Cz D, E, R, rg, S1, S2 National
Fr Cant, D, E, P1, P2, R, rg de´partement (90-96)
Ge D, E Land (9-16)
It D, E, R, S National
Mx D, P National
Pl D, E, P1, P2 National
Ro D, E, P1, P2, R National
Sp D, E, R Comunidad auto´noma (17-19)
Table S2. Elections studied in this paper at large scale for their evolution in time. Notation
is the same as in Tab. S1. For Czech Republic, “rg” means Election into regional councils, “S1” and
“S2” are respectively the first and second round of the Senate elections; for France, “Cant” refers to the
Cantonales elections and some referendums are only known at the national scale; for Italy, “S” means
Senate elections, and occur at the same time as Deputies elections (D) but with older registered voters.
In parenthesis, the total number of different provinces (or Cantons, etc.), which can change in time, in
the whole country.
since 1990 11; for Romania [20], since 1990; for Spain [21], since 1976; for Switzerland [22], since 1884
for referendums (R) and since 1919 for legislative elections (D). If an election needs two rounds, the first
one is considered, unless the contrary is indicated. The Mexican, Polish and Romanian Senate elections
are not shown here because they occur at the same time as Chamber of Deputies elections and have very
similar S results.
Table S2 summarizes the nature of elections studied in this paper, and also the scale of aggregate data
per country. Note that the last election analyzed in this paper is the Referendum which held in Italy on
June 2011. 12
Websites given in the References were accessed in December 2011. Part of the database used in this
paper can also be directly downloaded from [23].
• Elections studied at polling station scale
Polling stations analysis is restricted to polling stations which belong to one of the 100 most populated
municipalities (for the considered election). 31 elections at the polling station scale are studied in this
paper: 5 for Canada (each Canadian election of Tab. S1), with around 25000 polling stations; 13 for
France (French elections of Tab. S1 since 1999), with around 7000 polling stations; 4 for Mexico (each
Mexican election of Tab. S1), with around 55000 polling stations or ballot box; 5 for Poland (Polish
election of Tab. S1 from 2003 up to 2005), with around 8000 polling stations; and 4 for Romania (each
Romanian election of Tab. S1), with around 6000 polling stations. See Tab. S3 for some basic statistics
over polling stations of the 100 most populated municipalities.
11We have not data from the 1989 Chamber of Deputies (Sejm) election nor the two referendums in 1996.
12Official results (which took into account registered voters) of the Canadian Chamber of Deputies election, held on May
2011, were not published at the time we first submitted this paper. In Fig. S1, the involvement entropy over all provinces
would be ≈ 1.00 ± 0.02 and respectively 0.99 and 1.02 for Ontario and Quebec.
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Id S τ3 Id S τ3
Fr 1999 E 1.09 ± 0.05 -3.7 ± 0.6 Fr 2000 R 1.00 ± 0.11 -4.2 ± 0.6
Fr 2002 P1 1.00 ± 0.06 -2.1 ± 0.6 Fr 2002 P2 0.93 ± 0.10 -0.7 ± 0.6
Fr 2002 D 1.01 ± 0.06 -3.2 ± 0.7 Fr 2004 rg 1.09 ± 0.05 -2.8 ± 0.6
Fr 2004 E 1.03 ± 0.05 -4.6 ± 0.7 Fr 2005 R 0.99 ± 0.07 -2.5 ± 0.7
Fr 2007 P1 0.71 ± 0.11 -1.3 ± 0.7 Fr 2007 P2 0.83 ± 0.09 -0.1 ± 0.7
Fr 2007 D 1.03 ± 0.04 -3.8 ± 0.7 Fr 2009 E 1.02 ± 0.07 -4.6 ± 0.7
Fr 2010 rg 1.04 ± 0.05 -4.4 ± 0.7
Ca 1997 D 0.98 ± 0.08 -3.3 ± 1.3 Ca 2000 D 1.00 ± 0.06 -4.1 ± 1.1
Ca 2004 D 1.00 ± 0.05 -4.4 ± 0.9 Ca 2006 D 0.99 ± 0.05 -4.4 ± 0.8
Ca 2008 D 1.00 ± 0.05 -4.6 ± 0.9
Pl 2003 R 0.95 ± 0.10 -4.0 ± 0.9 Pl 2004 E 0.83 ± 0.13 -6.3 ± 0.8
Pl 2005 D 1.05 ± 0.08 -4.1 ± 0.9 Pl 2005 P1 1.00 ± 0.07 -4.9 ± 0.9
Pl 2005 P2 1.01 ± 0.05 -4.1 ± 0.9
Mx 2003 D 1.03 ± 0.07 -4.3 ± 0.9 Mx 2006 D 1.02 ± 0.07 -3.2 ± 0.8
Mx 2006 P 1.01 ± 0.07 -3.4 ± 0.8 Mx 2009 D 1.11 ± 0.10 -3.5 ± 0.9
Ro 2009 E 0.70 ± 0.13 -6.6 ± 0.9 Ro 2009 R 1.08 ± 0.05 -3.8 ± 0.7
Ro 2009 P1 1.04 ± 0.03 -4.5 ± 0.7 Ro 2009 P2 1.04 ± 0.03 -4.4 ± 0.7
Table S3. Elections studied at the polling station level. An election is identified (Id) by its
country, its year date and its nature. Mean value and standard deviation of S and of τ3 (see the SI
Section D) over ballot boxes in the 100 most populated municipalities.
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B. More details on data analysis
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Figure S1. Time evolution of the mean involvement entropy at large scale (national,
provincial, etc.). See Section A and Tab. S2, for more details and also for the end of compulsory voting
in Italy (cf. vertical dashed line) and in Austria. Whenever the scale of aggregate data is lower than the
national one, standard-deviations (weighted by the number of registered voters) are also shown as error
bars. Italian and Spanish graph insets show a variant of S where Blank Votes are categorized as Valid
Votes (see Section F for more discussion). See text for more explanation about some French curves.
Fig. S1 gathers all the available data (see in the SI, Section A for more details) at a large aggregate
scale (country, province, de´partement, etc.). When the scale of aggregate data is lower than the national
one, each point corresponds to a weighted (by population-size) mean value of involvement entropies at
lower scale (province, de´partement, etc.), and standard deviation is also given as error bar. The cases
where Blank Votes are distinguished from Null Votes (i.e. in Italy, Spain and Switzerland), call for a
specific discussion (see the SI, Section F).
Let us comment Fig. S1 on the case of the Chamber of Deputies elections in France, at the large
scale called de´partement (96 in quantity for metropolitan France, actually). One sees an involvement
entropy frequently equal to ≈ 0.8 until 1981, which then increases and gets greater than 1 until 2000,
and decreases a little and stabilizes to S ≈ 1after 2000. So, the civic involvement of the electorate (at the
de´partement scale) is relatively ordered until 1981 and get more and more disordered until 2000. After
2000, S seems to stabilize to a common value S ≈ 1 which is also reached for the European Parliament
elections and for local elections at different scales, such as the Re´gionales (∼ states) and the Cantonales
(∼ counties) elections.
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Figure S2. Moving average, as a function of time, per country of pa and pbn at national
scale for Chamber of Deputies elections. The average is made over 4 elections. Left: about ratio of
registered voters who do not take part to the election (pa); Right: about Blank and Null ratio (pbn).
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Figure S3. Histograms of S for the ≈ 200 (left) and 50 (right) most populated
municipalities, similarly to Fig. 8-d (with 100 most populated municipalities for the latter one).
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Figure S4. Evolution in time of scatter plots of (pa, pbn) at national level of 321 elections.
Elections are divided into the two groups in the same manner as in Fig. 6. Curves give the sets of
points (pa, pbn) such that S(pa, pbn) is equal to one of the two endpoints of the minimal interval of S
which contains 50% of events. Note if S is equal to the average value (weighted by the population size)
at lower aggregate scale (as provinces, de´partements, etc.) like in Fig. 6, the peak of S near S ≈ 1 would
be more narrowed and more centered on S = 1
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Figure S5. Scatter plots of (pa, pbn) of French municipalities according to their relative
population size, over elections since 2000 (similarly as in Fig. 8-b, c, d). The sets of points (pa, pbn)
such that S(pa, pbn) is equal to one of the two endpoints of the minimal interval of S which contains
50% of events (as in Fig. 9 for the most populated municipalities) are also plotted.
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C. Finite size effects
We show in this section that finite size effects over municipality-size, N , on the entropy-involvement
S, are relatively small for the most populated municipalities. Biases due to finite size effects have two
possible origins: (1) level of aggregation of the data, over N about a hundred to a million, influences S
measures, and (2) a statistical effect due to large numbers. Without a loss of generality, we examine these
two biases for French electoral data – with 20 elections at the municipality scale and 13 at the polling
station level, cf. the SI Section A. Lastly we show that the distribution of the involvement entropy which
is sharply peaked near S ≈ 1 for most populated towns is not due to considering a large number of N
per town.
(1) Scale at which data are aggregated
French municipality sizes range from around 10 to around 100, 000. In order to investigate how
aggregate data scale modifies the measurement of the involvement entropy S, for each municipality we
compare the results at the municipality scale with the one done at the polling station scale. Registered
voters per polling station do not exceed around one thousand in France. We compare for a municipality its
involvement entropy, S, measured at the municipality level, to the mean value, SPS , of the involvement
entropy over all the polling stations in the the considered municipality. Convexity of the logarithmic
function implies that the later is at most equal to the former. For each of the 200 most populated French
municipalities, and for each of the 13 French elections known at the polling station scale (see the SI
Section A), the gap between S and SPS is less than about 2% (except for very few and typical recording
errors of electoral data). Moreover, averaging S and SPS over samples of ≈ 200 municipalities of similar
sizes N provides a difference less than 1% for N & 1000.
In short, for large population municipalities, the bias introduced by the scale at which data are ag-
gregated is weak and does not affect the main conclusions of the paper.
(2) Statistical effects due to large numbers
Let us see if statistical fluctuations due to finite size effects considerably modify the expected values
of involvement entropy. Indeed, For independent events, according to the central limit theorem (under
conditions broadly applicable) fluctuations are on the order of 1/
√
N . This is expected to be the case
for the ratios pa and pbn, which should then lead to a bias in the entropy value. We want to estimate
this bias and see if it is negligible (say less than 1%). To do so, we make a simulation with artificial
data. For calibrating these data, we make use of the sample of the most populated municipalities. We
measure the average values pa and pbn of pa and pbn over all municipalities in this sample of the largest
municipality-size; and the corresponding standard deviations σa and σbn. The surrogate data consists in
a same number of “municipalities”, each one characterized by the same population size as in the empirical
data. For these surrogate-municipalities, we draw the numbers of Abstentionists and of Null-Blank votes
from binomial distributions, parametrized by the empirical average values and standard deviations of pa
and pbn, as follows.
Let a surrogate-municipality with N registered voters. Its numbers of Abstentionists, Na, and Null-
Blank votes, Nbn, are drawn from a binomial distribution such that:
Na = B(N ; pa + ηa),
Nbn = B(N ; pbn + ηbn), (S1)
where ηa and ηbn are independent random Gaussian noises of mean 0 and of standard deviation σa and
σbn, respectively. Note that here, for each citizen in a surrogate-municipality, probabilities to not vote
and to put a null-blank vote are mutually independent.
Now, we can compare the average values S(N) of municipal involvement entropy in a sample of ≈ N
surrogate-municipality-size, with S(Nmax) in the sample of the most populated municipalities. We find
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that the difference is less than 1% when N & 2000. In other words, for municipality-size greater than
around 2000, statistical fluctuations due to finite size effects are negligible for what concern the present
study.
To conclude, we have seen that, for French electoral data, finite size effects do not affect significantly
the municipal involvement entropy (i.e. by less than a 2% deviation) for N greater than 2000. Note
that 2000 is much less than the typical municipality size of the most populated municipalities, for which
the common value S ≈ 1 is frequently found. Lastly, the same analysis done for other countries for
which electoral data are also available at the polling station scale (see the SI Section A) give the same
results (see e.g. mean values of S over the 100 most populated municipalities, at the municipality scale
in Tab. S1, compared to those at ballot box scale in Tab. S3).
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Figure S6. Histograms of S of the 100 most populated towns compared with 100 artificial
towns (see text), in France, over elections since 2000.
Now, let us show that the shape of the distribution of S over the 100 most populated towns (which is
sharply peaked near S ≈ 1, apart from Austria) does not result from aggregating a large number of the
citizen choices. In other words, the shape of the distribution of the involvement entropy for the 100 most
populated towns (cf. Fig. 8-d) cannot be explained by a statistical bias due to a large number effect.
In order to see this point, 100 artificial town is created – in France, without he loss of generality.
Each artificial town results from the aggregation over 300 real small municipalities of real numbers of
registered voters (N), abstentionists (Na), blank and null votes (Nbn) and votes according to the list
of choices (Nc). In other words, an artificial town comes from the aggregation of real citizen choices
who live in small municipalities. Each municipality is taken into account only once. These 100 French
artificial towns have artificial aggregated registered voters (N) from 7000 to 330000, and is equal to 34000
in average. Fig. S6 allows one to compare the real distribution of S of the most populated French towns
over elections since 2000 with the one which results from these 100 artificial towns. These two histograms
are clearly different.
To conclude, the shape of the distribution of the involvement entropy of most populated towns (cf.
Fig. 8-d) is not due to a bias rooted in aggregating a large number of citizen choices. The shape itself
depends on real citizen choices who live in these towns.
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D. Logarithmic three choices value, τ3, of polling stations
As a supplement to the study of the entropy defined from the set of three ratios {pa, pc, pbn}, in this section
we introduce another variable, called logarithmic three choices value, τ3, which also takes into account
the set {pa, pc, pbn}. First, we show that the distribution of τ3, over polling stations in the 100 most
populated municipalities appears stable over time, and also similar between different countries. Secondly,
we justify our interest for this logarithmic three choices value from hypothesis on agents behavior. We
compare two simple decision making rules, and give arguments against the most intuitive one, that of a
choice decomposed into two successive binary choice decisions (first to vote or not, then to cast a valid
vote or not). This confirms in a different way the existence of correlations between pa and pbn (see Main
text, Results Section, paragraph on “Abstentions, valid votes and blank or null votes”).
D.1. Logarithmic three choices value of polling stations in most populated towns
In this section we generalize the analysis done in [24, 25], where the statistics of the logarithmic turnout
rate, τ = ln pa1−pa , is studied. When considering the three possible values, pa, pbn, pbn, the logarithmic
three choices value τ3, as justified below Section D.2, can be defined by
τ3 = ln
(pc · pbn
(pa)2
)
. (S2)
Fig. S7 shows the pdf of the logarithmic three choices value τ3 over different polling stations of the 100
most populated towns in each country (apart from Canadian ones because more than third of polling
stations have pbn = 0, which lead to their logarithmic three choices values τ3 are undefined), i.e. the
probability P (τ3)dτ3 that a given polling station, inside the 100 most populated towns, has τ3 to within
dτ3. Although the average 〈τ3〉 over these polling stations varies quite substantially between elections
(see Fig. S9 and Tab. S3), the shape of the distribution of τ3 − 〈τ3〉 is quite stable across elections for
each country.
Consider now the normalized τ3 values, that is τˆ3 =
τ3−〈τ3〉
σ
, where 〈τ3〉 and σ are respectively the mean
value and the standard deviation of τ3 over polling stations of the 100 most populated municipalities.
Fig. S8 shows that the remarkable similarity between the distributions of these normalized logarithmic
three choices for French, Mexican, Romanian and half Polish elections. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test,
where one only allows for a relative shift of the normalized distributions P (τˆ3), over polling stations of
the 100 most populated towns, does not allow one to reject the hypothesis that the distribution P (τˆ3) is
the same for all elections (except for half of the Polish elections).
Remark: there is not a one-to-one relation between the logarithmic three choices value, τ3, and the
involvement entropy S. Indeed, it is enough to invoke that the three ratios {pa, pc, pbn} play a symmetric
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Figure S7. Distribution over polling stations of the 100 most populated towns of
P (τ3 − 〈τ〉) for each election, where τ3 is the logarithmic three choices value and 〈τ3〉 its average
value over all concerned polling stations.
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Figure S8. Distribution of normalized τ3
over polling stations of the 100 most
populated towns for 26 elections. The dotted
line and the dashed line show respectively
Pl-2003-R and Pl-2005-D elections. A
normalized Gaussian is also plotted.
role for S, and not for τ3. Fig. S9 plots τ3 with respect to S for their average values over polling stations
in each of the 100 most populated towns (see also Tab. S3 for basics statistics of S and τ3 over polling
stations in the 100 most populated municipalities).
D.2. Towards a behavioral model in the three choices case
Elaborating upon standard hypothesis on agents behavior, the goal of this section is to explain why τ3
defined above is the natural generalization of the logarithmic turnout rate introduced in [24, 25] for a
single binary choice.
• Recall: Threshold decision rule for a single binary choice
Let us first recall the rationale for introducing the logarithmic turnout rate. We consider N agents making
a binary decision. Agent i makes its decision ni, ni ∈ {0, 1}, according to
ni = Θ(hi +H), (S3)
with Θ(x ≥ 0) = 1 and Θ(x < 0) = 0. Here hi is an idiosyncratic term characterizing the bias of agent
i in favor of the decision to vote (ni = 1). Idiosyncrasies are assumed independent random variables
(hence uncorrelated between agents). H is a global bias, a field identically applied to all agents, which
can be seen as a ‘cultural field’ [25]. Note that here there is no direct interaction between agents.
According to this decision rule (Eq. (S3)), in the large size limit N →∞, the fraction pv = 1−pa of de-
cisions 1 among the population, is equal to the cumulative distribution of idiosyncrasies: pv = P>(−H) ≡∫∞
−H P (h)dh. If idiosyncrasies are assumed to be distributed according to a logistic distribution [26] of
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Figure S9. Logarithmic three choices
value, τ3, with respect to involvement
entropy S. Measures come from mean values of
τ3 and S over polling stations in each of the 100
most populated towns. Curves are smoothed.
Note that there is not a one-to-one relation
between τ3 and S.
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zero mean and of unity width, it comes that
pv =
1
1 + e−H
, or equivalently,
H = ln
( pv
1− pv
)
. (S4)
This justifies to study the statistics of the logarithmic turnout rate τ = ln
(
pv
1−pv
)
. As shown in [25, 27],
the logarithmic turnout rate across French municipalities is remarkably stable over time, which allows
one to make predictions that can be confronted with empirical observation [28, 29].
• Two binary decisions
Now, we want to generalize to the case of three choices, not to vote, to cast a blank/null vote, and to
cast a valid vote. One possibility is to assume a sequential decision (Figure S10, right): first to decide to
vote or not, and if yes, then to decide to cast a blank/null vote, or to cast a valid vote. The alternative
is to assume two mutually exclusive decisions (Figure S10, left). We explore both hypothesis, and show
that data rule out the first one.
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Figure S10. Two different hypothesis on agents behavior: (a) two mutually exclusive binary
decisions; (b) two sequential binary decisions.
• Two mutually exclusive decisions
Here we consider that, (1), to vote according to the list of choices, and (2), to cast a blank or null vote,
are two mutually exclusive decisions. In other words, abstentionists are considered like a reservoir from
which agents decide to make or not the choice (1) or the choice (2); moreover if they decide to do choice
(1) (or conversely (2)), they do not decide anymore to make or not the choice (2) (or conversely (1)). Let
Hc the global field in favor of the choice (1) (to vote according to the list of choices), and p
0
c the global
ratio if choice (1) was unique, i.e. without any existence of choice (2) (see Fig. S10-a). Conversely, Hbn
and p0bn refer to choice (2) (to put a blank or null vote) if it was a unique choice. From Eq. (S4), and
again assuming a logistic distribution of idiosyncrasies, it comes
p0c = P>(−Hc), thus, Hc = ln
( p0c
1− p0c
)
,
p0bn = P>(−Hbn), thus, Hbn = ln
( p0bn
1− p0bn
)
. (S5)
Now choice (1) (respectively (2)), is made by agents who have not decided to make the other choice (2)
(respectively (1)). Hence, the ratio pc (respectively pbn) is related to the ratio p
0
c (respectively p
0
bn) that
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would result from a single binary choice according to:
p0c =
pc
1−pbn
,
p0bn =
pbn
1−pc
. (S6)
Writing H ≡ Hc + Hbn, the sum of civic global fields applied to registered voters in this 3 choices
process, Eqs. (S5,S6) yield to 13
H = ln
(pc · pbn
(pa)2
)
. (S7)
Hence under the hypothesis of two mutually exclusive binary decisions, the quantity to study is the log-
arithmic three choices rate τ3 = ln
(
pc·pbn
(pa)2
)
. This is what is done above, Section D.1.
• Two sequential binary threshold decisions
Now, let us consider the hypothesis of two sequential binary decisions. The first binary decision is to vote
or not to vote, and the second binary decision is to decide to cast a valid vote (according to the list of
choices) or to put an invalid vote (i.e. a Blank or Null vote) given that the considered agent is a voter.
Let Hv the global field related to the first decision, i.e. to vote (see Fig. S10-b). The ratio of voters,
pv, over registered voters writes as:
pv = P>(−Hv), or, Hv = ln
( pv
1− pv
)
. (S8)
(Remind that pv = 1 − pa = pc + pbn.) Let Hc|v the global bias related to the second binary decision
(given that the agent is a voter), that is the bias in favor to put a vote according to the list of choices.
The ratio of votes according to the list of choice over voters is written as
pc
pv
= P>(−Hc|v), or, Hc|v = ln
( pcpv
1− pc
pv
)
= ln
( pc
pbn
)
. (S9)
The second decision to put a Blank or Null vote is such that Hbn|v = −Hc|v (since pbn/pv = P>(−Hbn|v)
and Hbn|v = ln
(
pbn
pc
)
).
According to this two sequential binary choices, the global field which leads a registered voter to put
a Valid vote is H ′c = Hv +Hc|v = ln
(
pv ·pc
pa·pbn
)
; and to put a Blank or Null vote is H ′bn = Hv +Hbn|v =
ln
(
pv ·pbn
pa·pc
)
. When Blank or Null ratio is very small (pbn ≪ 1), pc ≃ pa, hence one has H ′bn ≃ τ3. So,
statistics of H ′bn are expected to be very similar to those of τ3.
If this sequential binary decisions point of view was correct, H ′bn = ln
(
pv ·pbn
pa·pc
)
and H ′c = ln
(
pv ·pc
pa·pbn
)
would share the same main features. However, this is strongly rejected by the empirical data. The shape
of the distribution over polling stations of the 100 most populated towns of H ′bn − 〈H ′bn〉 is not constant
from election to election (not shown here), this for each country over various elections. This is confirmed
making use of Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests.
To conclude the analysis of the fluctuations around the mean of τ3, H
′
bn and H
′
c allows one to reject
the hypothesis of a sequential binary choice, and to support the one of two mutually exclusive choices.
13When one of the three ratios {pa, pc, pbn} is equal to zero, τ3 is undefined.
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E. Looking for signs of tension, through polling stations analysis
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Figure S11. Civic-involvement heterogeneity (at the polling station scale) in a town with
respect to the involvement entropy of the town. Curves are smoothed and concern the 100 most
populated municipalities. Benchmark (see text) curves are plotted in the insets. Heterogeneity
measures result from standard deviation of involvement entropy of polling stations (S11-a),
KullbackLeibler divergence between a polling stations and other polling stations of the town (S11-b),
and standard deviation of logarithmic 3 choices value of polling stations (S11-c). Fig. S11-d: same as
Fig. S11-a, but restricted for the 5 elections which deviate the more from S ≈ 1, where plain lines and
dashed line plot respectively real data and benchmark curves.
This section seeks to detect some ‘tension’, in connection with the involvement entropy. We follow
the assumption that ‘tension’ have some effects for polling stations heterogeneity inside a town. In
other words, we try to detect some specific variation of polling stations heterogeneity in a given town, in
connection with the involvement entropy of this town. Polling stations (inside a same town) heterogeneity
is investigated by three different ways: (1) standard deviation of involvement entropies over all polling
stations of the considered town; (2) KullbackLeibler divergence from one polling station compared to
other polling station of the town; (3) standard deviation of the logarithmic three choices value (because
the shape of its distribution is stable, see the SI Section D) over all polling stations of the town.
The analysis uses polling stations inside the 100 most populated towns (see the SI Section A for more
details). Real results will be compared to a benchmark. The benchmark is based on the same hetero-
geneity of ratios pa (idem for pc, and pbn) of polling stations for every town.
Let a town and a polling station of this town respectively called α and αi. The polling station αi has
some measures, for instance its number of registered votersNαi , and the set of 3 ratios {pa,αi , pc, αi , pbn, αi}
that provides its involvement entropy Sαi and its logarithmic three choices value τ3, αi . The average over
all the polling stations of the town (weighted by the number of registered voters, Nαi), gives the corre-
sponding value for the whole town α, e.g. the set of 3 ratios {pa,α, pc, α, pbn, α}, its involvement entropy
Sα, and its logarithmic three choices value τ3, α. The weighted (by the number of registered voters)
standard deviation over all the polling stations αi of the town α is written as δ[..]α, like for instance
δ[pa]α, etc., δ[S]α and δ[τ3]α. These quantify the heterogeneities within the town α.
Fig. S11-a plots involvement entropy heterogeneity of a town α (i.e. δ[S]α) with respect to its in-
volvement entropy (i.e. Sα). One should pay attention to the fact that δ[S]α going trough a minimum
as Sα ≈ 1 could just be a consequence of |dS| having a minimum near pbn ≈ 0 and pa ≈ 0.5. Hence the
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benchmark presented here consists in comparing the empirical data with surrogate ones for which the
heterogeneity in pa, pc an pbn is the same for all municipalities, up to a binomial noise.
Here, the benchmark forces the same heterogeneity of the set of ratios {pa, pc, pbn} for every town,
but keep their initial value of {pa, pc, pbn} for the whole town. In other words, let a town α, δ[pa]α, δ[pc]α
and δ[pbn]α have the same values than in other towns; but {pa,α, pc, α, pbn, α} are the real values of the
town α, measured by the election.
The benchmark is realized as follows. First, we measure for each town α, pa, α and pbn, α; and also
δ[pa]α and δ[pbn]α. The average values of heterogeneities δ[pa]α and δ[pbn]α over the 100 considered
towns are respectively written as δpa and δpbn . Secondly, we drawn from a binomial distribution, for each
polling station αi, its number of registered voters who do not take part to the election (Na, αi) and the
number of Blank and Null votes (Nbn, αi), such that:
Na, αi = B(Nαi ; pa, α + ηa),
Nbn, αi = B(Nαi ; pbn, α + ηbn), (S10)
where ηa and ηbn are independent Gaussian noises of mean 0 and of standard deviation δpa and δpbn
respectively, and Nαi is the real number of registered voters of the polling station αi of the considered
town α. Note that we use a binomial distribution in order to take into account finite size effects; and
here, for each citizen in a surrogate-polling station, probabilities to not vote and to put a null-blank vote
are mutually independent.
Instead of making use of standard-errors, an alternative measure of heterogeneity is provided by
making use of the so-called KullbackLeibler divergence which characterizes the difference between two
probability distributions. For each polling station αi of a given town α, we compute the divergence
DKLαi from the polling station distribution Pαi to the rest of the town, Qαi ≡ Pα−αi ,
DKLαi ≡
∑
j
Pαi(j) log
Pαi(j)
Qαi(j)
(S11)
where, here and in the following, for any distribution we write P (j), j = 1, 2, 3, instead of pa, pc, pbn.
Then we compute the mean KullbackLeibler divergence, DKLα, of the town α by averaging over all
polling stations, weighting by the corresponding number of registered voters, Nαi .
DKLα ≡
∑
i
Nαi
Nα
DKLαi (S12)
This mean KullbackLeibler divergence DKLα gives us a measure of heterogeneity of polling stations into
a town α.
Fig. S11 compares benchmarks curves and empirical data 14. It appears that, the smaller the involve-
ment entropy S (with S . 0.85), the smaller the involvement entropy heterogeneity at the polling station
level (see more specifically Fig. S11-d). Heterogeneity of polling stations in a same town is measured via
three different ways: standard deviations of the involvement entropy and the logarithmic three choices
ratio, and also via the KullbackLeibler divergence. In other words, the more the town is “ordered” (for
its electorate civic-involvement), the more the town is homogeneous (at the polling station scale, and still
for a civic involvement point of view). Note also that this point is particularly clear when the ratio pc
is high (e.g. for 3 French elections), compared to cases where pa are high (e.g. for European Parliament
elections in Romania and Poland). It can also be noted that often heterogeneity of involvement entropies
of polling stations inside towns (δ[S]α) has a significantly minimal value when their involvement entropies
(Sα) are around 1, and this minimization is much more marked for real data than for benchmark ones.
14In this section, extreme values greater than 3 sigma are note taken into account in order to remove some electoral
errors, etc.
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F. Disentangling Blank votes from Null votes
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Figure S12. Blank votes are grouped with: (1) Null votes (like in the main text, cf. Eq. (2)) in black;
(2) Valid Votes or another vote included in the list of choices (cf. Eq. (S14)) in red; (3) citizens who do
not take part to the election (cf. Eq. (S15)) in green. Top: mean values of S, Sb≡c, Sb≡a, over bins with
around 100 municipalities of size ≈ N (like in Fig. 5). Bottom: Evolution in time of S, Sb≡c, Sb≡a (with
the same scale of aggregate data as in Figs. 6 and S1). For the sake of clarity, standard deviations over
Swiss Cantons and Spanish Comunidades auto´nomas are note shown. Each point (R) for Swiss graph
gives the average of around 20 Swiss referendums. The end of Italian compulsory voting is shown by a
vertical line.
Italy 15, Spain and Switzerland 16 are countries for which Blank votes are distinguished from Null
votes. Let Nb and Nn the number of citizens who respectively vote Blank and Null amongst N registered
voters (of one municipality, Canton, Comunidad auto´noma, the whole country). Ratios, or probabilities,
to respectively vote Blank and Null are
pb =
Nb
N
, pn =
Nn
N
. (S13)
In such cases, it is legitimate to consider that Blank votes should be categorized with votes in favor
of one of a the proposed choices to the election. Then, the Blank vote has not a ‘marginal’ involvement
meaning, like previously, but its citizen involvement is similar to another Valid vote according to the list
of choices of the election. One should then consider a modified involvement entropy, defined from the
3-set ratios (of sum unity) {pa, (pc + pb), pn}, that is
Sb≡c = −pa log(pa)− (pc + pb) log(pc + pb)− pn log(pn). (S14)
Alternatively, one may consider that Blank votes loose their ‘marginal’ aspect in citizen involvement,
and should be categorized as votes from citizen who do not take part to the election. Then the relevant
15We only analyze the first question asked in a Referendum. Senate elections are note shown in Fig. S12-below because
they are very similar to Chamber of Deputies (D) elections.
16Chamber of deputies elections (D) distinguish, in our database, Blank vote between Null votes since 1971; and since
1887 for votations (or referendums).
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modified involvement entropy, defined from the 3-set ratios (still of sum unity) {(pa + pb), pc, pn}, writes
as
Sb≡a = −(pa + pb) log(pa + pb)− pc log(pc)− pn log(pn). (S15)
Figures S12 shows for Italy, Spain and Switzerland, the involvement entropy, S, and the modified
versions, Sb≡c and Sb≡a: (1) for municipalities and with respect to the municipality-size N (as in Fig. 5);
(2) for the whole country (directly for Italy, and as a weighted mean by population-size over 25 or 26
Swiss Cantons and 17 or 19 Spanish Comunidades auto´nomas) as a function of time (as in Figs. 6 and
S1). Fig. 13 shows the modified involvement entropy Sb≡c (Sb≡a which is not shown, is very close to
Sb≡c), with respect to the involvement entropy S, for ∼ 530 Swiss Referendums.
Figure S12 exhibits some trends and regularities that depend on the values of involvement entropy S.
(1) When S < 1 (e.g. in Italian and Spanish Chamber of Deputies elections, both at municipality scale
or at large scale of aggregate data), modified involvement entropies are smaller than S. This means a
greater order of the modified citizen involvement. It can be interpreted as follows: the loss of nuance or
specificity (for citizen involvement) that Blank vote have, implies a greater polarization or heterogeneity
of the electorate, still split into 3 groups. (2) When S ≈ 1, two different cases arise. First, for Spanish
European Parliament elections, Swiss Chamber of Deputies elections and Referendums (uniquely for the
latter, since the 2000s), both at municipality scale or at large scale of aggregate data: the modified
involvement entropies are slightly lower than S, but still ≈ 1. Second, for earlier Swiss Referendums, and
particularly before the 1960s: Sb≡c (or Sb≡a) are lower than S, but not slightly lower. (3) When S > 1
and S ≇ 1 (e.g. for Italian European Parliament elections, both at municipality scale or at large scale of
aggregate data, and Spanish Referendums, particularly 1986 and 2005 ones, at provincial scale), modified
involvement entropies are still lower than S. But one more time, it is surprising to notice that modified
involvement entropies are such that Sb≡c ≈ 1 (or Sb≡a ≈ 1). It can be explained as follows: subtlety
or specificity of citizen involvement due to Blank votes means an increasing of disorder of the electorate
involvement. The loss of this subtlety or specificity (i.e. considering Blank votes like another vote in
favor of the list of choices, or like another abstentionist) implies a loss of ‘tension’ contained in electoral
campaign. And strikingly, this loss of ‘tension’ provides a new entropy, like the usual common-value of
involvement entropy, ≈ 1.
Note that above items (1) and (3) (i.e. when significantly S < 1 or S > 1), pointed out in Fig. S12,
are clearly shown in Fig. 13 for Swiss Referendums. (In the Fig. 13, S′ means Sb≡c, which is very
near to Sb≡a on average.) Note also that the surprising plateau (which provides modified involvement
entropies equal to ≈ 1, on average, when S & 1.05) does not exist, in our database, for most populated
municipalities. For the latter case (not shown), the around 100 most populated municipalities for which
S & 1.05, uniquely provides Sb≡c (or Sb≡a) lower than S such that, on average, Sb≡c ≈ 1 (or Sb≡a ≈ 1),
but without a plateau.
Lastly, this study does not allow us to know whether it is more meaningful (according to the entropy
of the electorate involvement) to consider Blank vote like another vote proposed in the list of choices or
like another abstentionist vote. Nevertheless, in our database, Blank votes seem more meaningful that
Null Votes in Spain and in Switzerland. Indeed, when pn and pb are interchanged between each other in
Eqs. (S14) or (S15), above item (3) (when significantly S > 1, then the modified involvement entropy is
≈ 1) does clearly not exist for Spanish and Swiss Referendums.
To conclude, let us recall the main point of this section: when involvement entropy S does not obey
to the common occurrence S ≈ 1 for high population-size municipalities, or at large aggregate scale,
because the citizen involvement of the electorate is too much disordered (i.e. significantly S > 1), then
the modified involvement entropy (by the loss of the specificity of Blank votes) takes on average the same
common value ≈ 1.
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